IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/46283.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results

Author

Listed:
  • Bimonte, Giovanna

Abstract

It is well known that in a differential information economy the free coalition formation may imply some theoretical difficulties. It does not suffice to say that a coalition can be formed by several agents. We define a set of all possible coalitions as the set of those coalitions that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way, a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\Sigma$ is alowed to form. In such way, we fix over the set of agents an aggregation rule for which the coalitions can be formed only if they belong to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that can be joined by traders. The main result is the equivalence between two private core concept: the classical one for a differential information economy and the private core restricted.

Suggested Citation

  • Bimonte, Giovanna, 2013. "A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results," MPRA Paper 46283, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46283
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46283/1/MPRA_paper_46283.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-580, May.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1983. "A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 43-55, January.
    3. Okuda, Hidesuke & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1985. "Core allocations and the dimension of the cone of efficiency price vectors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 166-171, February.
    4. Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis & Dionysius Glycopantis, 2001. "An extensive form interpretation of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 293-319.
    5. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-586, May.
    6. Giovanna Bimonte & Maria Graziano, 2009. "The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 331-350, February.
    7. M. Ali Khan, 1974. "Some Equivalence Theorems," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 549-565.
    8. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giovanna Bimonte, 2013. "A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results," Working Papers 3_230, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno.
    2. Chiara Donnini & Marialaura Pesce, 2023. "Fairness and formation rules of coalitions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 933-960, December.
    3. Bhowmik, Anuj & Saha, Sandipan, 2022. "On blocking mechanisms in economies with club goods," MPRA Paper 114928, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2011. "Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 35618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Anuj Bhowmik & Japneet Kaur, 2022. "Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2022-014, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    6. Basile, Achille & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2001. "On the edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 219-240, December.
    7. Robert P. Gilles, 2018. "The Core of an Economy with an Endogenous Social Division of Labour," Papers 1809.01470, arXiv.org.
    8. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo & Yamazaki, Akira, 2007. "On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 615-628, June.
    9. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2013. "Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-57.
    10. Giovanna Bimonte & Maria Graziano, 2009. "The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 331-350, February.
    11. Bhowmik, Anuj & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2015. "On Vind’s theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-36.
    12. Pesce, Marialaura, 2014. "The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 33-45.
    13. GREENBERG, Joseph & WEBER, Shlomo & YAMAZAKI, Akira, 2004. "On blocking coalitions : linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. Bhowmik Anuj & Gabriella Graziano Maria, 2020. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-29, January.
    15. Achille Basile & Chiara Donnini & Maria Graziano, 2010. "Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 147-180, October.
    16. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.
    17. Achille Basile & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2016. "Oligopoly And Cost Sharing In Economies With Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 487-506, May.
    18. De Simone, Anna & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2003. "Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-73, February.
    19. Wei He & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "A New Perspective on Rational Expectations," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1317, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    20. He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2015. "Equilibrium theory under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 86-95.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential information economy; restriction on coalition formation; private core.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.