IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Financial Lobby and Impact of Other Stakeholders in the EU: A good model for emancipation of the financial system in Kosovo

  • govori, fadil

Lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it is not surprising if you consider the issue of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of financial markets and financial industry in the EU and Kosovo. However, the complex and inscrutable institutional structures in EU inevitably result in an inevitable quality of lobbying, which give more influence to the stakeholders that have the resources to organize and develop systematic lobbying activities. This paper describes how lobbying of influential institutions groups in EU, involved in decision making about financial services and markets, occurs through official channels, such as public consultations, and through informal means, such as close meetings between lobbyists and decision makers or officials within EU institutions. In this context we intend to rationalize such a behavior pattern in the regulation of the financial system in Kosovo. Kosovo has some fundamental problems in the field of regulation of the financial system and financial industry in conformity with the rules of functioning of the market economies. Instead of formal and official conversation between interest groups about the regulation of financial system, frequently are used corrupt models of influence which later are classified as criminal, and often classified as organized crime activities. From this point of view lobbying should be considered as a reasonable option within the formal structures of governance of financial markets and financial industry in Kosovo.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38866.

in new window

Date of creation: 10 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38866
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38866. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.