Effizienz der staatlichen Riester-Förderung - Eine empirische Analyse mit dem Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP)
[Effectiveness of the public Riester subsidies - An empirical analysis using the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)]
While private pensions have long been an integral part of old age insurance in America, it is now also in Germany on the rise. To increase the attractiveness and acceptance of private pension provision in the population, saving incentives have been used. In Germany, a Riester saver expects a savings subsidy and a special expense deduction. In addition, all contributions to private retirement provision are taxed downstream. The incentive design is at the expense of the state budget, so the question of the efficiency of savings incentives, such as the Riester pension is an issue of central importance. Empirical studies that have addressed the effective-ness of savings incentives, have thereby limited solely to the effect on the savings rate. The results of these papers are very different. In this work the efficiency of the Riester-subsidy has a much wider interpretation. In particular, one should not limit the usefulness of such a fund-ing measure only on increasing the savings rate. As a fact can be established that an increase of signed Riester contracts is already a benefit of increased funding, depending on the kind of saving which had been substituted. An empirical analysis based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel shows that the objectives have already partly been achieved since many the likelihood of signing a Riester contract increases with the number of children. Additionally individuals with low income are increasingly signing Riester contracts.
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