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A Single-Mindedness model with n generations

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  • Emanuele, Canegrati

Abstract

In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget, some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further- more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for politicians is considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele, Canegrati, 2007. "A Single-Mindedness model with n generations," MPRA Paper 2548, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2548
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2548/1/MPRA_paper_2548.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 856-866, December.
    3. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Social Security, Retirement, and the Single-Mindedness of the Electorate," NBER Working Papers 9691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories," Economics Working Papers 384, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mulligan, Casey B. & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," Working Papers 154, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    7. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
    8. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform," NBER Working Papers 7119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Paola Profeta, 2002. "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 331-348, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Rocha de Sousa, 2010. "A single minded European representation? From illusion and delusion to reality of a European single seat," Economics Working Papers 2_2010, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    income distribution; probabilistic voting models; Single-mindedness; overlapping generations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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