A complementary approach to transitive rationalizability
In this article, we study the axiomatic foundations of revealed preference theory. We define two revealed relations from the weak and strong revealed preference. The alternative x is preferred to y with respect to U if x, being available in an admissible set implies, the rejecting of y; and x is preferred to y with respect to Q if the rejecting of x implies the rejecting of y. The purpose of the paper is to show that the strong axiom of revealed preference and Hansson's axiom of revealed preference can be given with the help of U and Q and their extension properties.
|Date of creation:||07 Dec 1999|
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- Kotaro Suzumura, 1976. "Rational Choice and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 149-158.
- Duggan, John, 1999. "A General Extension Theorem for Binary Relations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-16, May.
- Clark, Stephen A, 1985. "A Complementary Approach to the Strong and Weak Axioms of Revealed Preference," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1459-1463, November.
- Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-390, November.
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