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The Economics of Student Attendance

Author

Listed:
  • Pipergias Analytis, Pantelis
  • Ramachandran, Rajesh
  • Rauh, Chris
  • Willis, Jack

Abstract

The most common method of education remains that of the student teacher relationship in the classroom. Within this framework, although the student has the final choice on attendance, the educational institution can affect his relevant incentives. At the two extremes, full attendance can be mandatory for completion of the course, or attendance can be entirely optional. This article begins with a theoretical model showing that under the assumptions of rational individuals, no externalities, and “perfect evaluation methods”, optional attendance is optimal. The three central assumptions of the model are then relaxed to show that under certain conditions, assuming a high social value of education, institutional intervention can be justified economically. The approach is enriched with many practical examples, and the efficiency of numerous attendance rules is discussed. The article concludes with the deduction of policy recommendations for educational institutions

Suggested Citation

  • Pipergias Analytis, Pantelis & Ramachandran, Rajesh & Rauh, Chris & Willis, Jack, 2008. "The Economics of Student Attendance," MPRA Paper 10848, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10848
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10848/1/MPRA_paper_10848.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    attendance laws; time allocation; educational production funtions; screening; mandatory attendance;

    JEL classification:

    • A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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