Public Firms in a Dynamic Third Market Model
We set the third market model in a dynamic context to decide whether a country can achieve benefits by subsidizing a public rm's exports. We use calculus of variations with the constraint that the welfare is either maximized or grows at constant rate, reflecting the public concern of the firm. We conclude that a subsidy can be a good strategy for the country in some instances, even though only over a finite period of time. The duration of this period depends on the output strategy of the public firm as well as on exogenous factors.
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"A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade,"
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