Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy
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References listed on IDEAS
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011.
"Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 167-188.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Discussion Papers 10-015, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2012. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Papers of Peter Cramton 11ckrs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; incentive auction;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
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