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Collusion and Selective Supervision


  • Alberto Motta

    () (University di Padova)


This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing in combating collusion within organizations, or in regulatory setups. In a mechanism-design problem involving a principal-supervisor-agent we show the role of endogenous selection of supervisory activity by the principal. One simple example is a mechanism in which the agent bypasses the supervisor and contracts directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative information structures, collusive behaviors and specification of agent's types. Applications include self-reporting of crimes, tax amnesties, immigration amnesties, work contracts specifying di¤erent degrees of discretion, mechanisms based on recommendation letters, embassies issuing immigration permits, and hiring committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Motta, 2009. "Collusion and Selective Supervision," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0093, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  • Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0093

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    Cited by:

    1. Dobrescu, Loretti I. & Luca, Michael & Motta, Alberto, 2013. "What makes a critic tick? Connected authors and the determinants of book reviews," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-103.
    2. Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio & Jorge Ponce, 2016. "Flexible and Mandatory Banking Supervision," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-09, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
    4. Maitra, Pushkar & Mitra, Sandip & Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Visaria, Sujata, 2017. "Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 306-337.
    5. Orhan Hilmi Yazar, 2015. "Regulation with Chinese Characteristics: Deciphering Banking Regulation in China," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs - China aktuell, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 44(2), pages 135-166.

    More about this item


    Collusion; supervision; delegation; mechanism design.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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