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Codebook For Analyzing Content And Function Of Communication In Social-Ecological Dilemma Experiments


  • DeCaro, Daniel


This codebook provides concepts and methodologies for coding and quantifying the content and function of communication in group social dilemma experiments, specifically with a social and ecological component (e.g., common pool resource dilemma). The content that is coded pertains to such categories as small talk, humor, information exchange (e.g., ecological, social, institutional), enforcement (e.g., praise, warnings, threats), decision making (e.g., proposals, choosing). Functional categories pertain to key functions needed for group members to govern the dilemma: e.g., develop agreements, make group decisions (e.g., democratic decision making), resolve conflicts, and enforce compliance. This codebook provides guidance for metrics to associate coded communication content and function to observed cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • DeCaro, Daniel, 2021. "Codebook For Analyzing Content And Function Of Communication In Social-Ecological Dilemma Experiments," SocArXiv 856hm, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:856hm
    DOI: 10.31219/

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-401, September.
    2. Roy Gardner & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, July.
    3. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    4. Vollan, Bjørn, 2008. "Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 560-573, November.
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