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Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher J. Ellis

    (University of Oregon)

  • Oguzhan C. Dincer

    (Massey University)

  • Glenn R. Waddell

    (University of Oregon)

Abstract

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. Ellis & Oguzhan C. Dincer & Glenn R. Waddell, 2005. "Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-5, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jan 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-5
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    File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2005-5_Ellis_Decentralization.pdf
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    Cited by:

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    2. Guych NURYYEV & Charles HICKSON, 2015. "Corruption Centralization, Investments, and Growth: Analysis of 62 countries for 1995-2007," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 15(1), pages 17-30.
    3. Oguzhan C. Dincer & Burak Gunalp, 2012. "Corruption And Income Inequality In The United States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 283-292, April.
    4. Shih-Ying Wu & Mei-Jane Teng, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 237-262, September.
    5. Kshitiz Shrestha & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez & Charles Hankla, 2023. "Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 411-439, March.
    6. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Don't Blame the Weather: Federal Natural Disaster Aid and Public Corruption," Working Papers 1321, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    7. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "How long does it take for government decentralization to affect corruption?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 273-305, August.
    8. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Do fiscal decentralization and government fragmentation affect corruption in different ways? Evidence from a panel data analysis," Chapters, in: Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Challenge of Local Government Size, chapter 5, pages 121-147, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?," Working Papers 1301, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    10. Tarkan Cavusoglu & Oguzhan Dincer, 2015. "Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 285-306, July.
    11. Blane D. Lewis & Adrianus Hendrawan, 2018. "The impact of mayor-council coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," Departmental Working Papers 2018-19, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    12. Pierre Salmon, 2013. "Decentralization and growth: what if the cross-jurisdiction approach had met a dead end?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 87-107, June.
    13. Tarkan Cavusoglu & Oguzhan Dincer, 2015. "Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(1), pages 285-306, July.
    14. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2010. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 631-646, April.
    15. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions," Working Papers 1322, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    16. Lewis, Blane D. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2019. "The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 178-191.
    17. Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders, 2012. "Corruption, institutions and regulation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 263-285, September.
    18. Changwony, Frederick Kibon & Paterson, Audrey S., 2019. "Accounting practice, fiscal decentralization and corruption," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5).
    19. Dincer, Oguzhan & Gunalp, Burak, 2020. "The effects of federal regulations on corruption in U.S. States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    20. Christian Leßmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2010. "Föderalismus und Korruption - ist Dezentralisierung ein geeignetes Mittel zur Korruptionsbekämpfung?," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(04), pages 43-48, 08.
    21. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2017. "Corruption and the public display of wealth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 827-840, August.
    22. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2008. "Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States," EPRU Working Paper Series 08-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other

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