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Föderalismus und Korruption - ist Dezentralisierung ein geeignetes Mittel zur Korruptionsbekämpfung?

  • Christian Leßmann
  • Gunther Markwardt

Föderalismus und Dezentralisierung sind Themen, die weltweit einen festen Platz auf der politischen Agenda einnehmen. Dezentralisierungsprozesse treten bspw. verstärkt in zahlreichen osteuropäischen Staaten aber auch in Spanien, Belgien und in und vielen Entwicklungsländern auf. Diese Maßnahmen sollen u. a. das Wirtschaftswachstum stärken; den Umfang der Staatstätigkeit beschränken und die Qualität der Regierungsführung (Governance) verbessern. Im Kern dieser Analyse steht die Frage, ob Dezentralisierung ein geeignetes Instrument für die Bekämpfung von Korruption ist und ob institutionelle Unterschiede für den Zusammenhang zwischen Dezentralisierung und Korruption von Bedeutung sind.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/ZS/ZS-ifo_Dresden_berichtet/zs-drber-2010/ifodb_2010_4_43_48.pdf
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Article provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal ifo Dresden berichtet.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 04 (08)
Pages: 43-48

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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodre:v:17:y:2010:i:04:p:43-48
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  1. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia," NBER Working Papers 7616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2010. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 631-646, April.
  3. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
  4. Christopher J. Ellis & Oguzhan C. Dincer & Glenn R. Waddell, 2005. "Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-5, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jan 2006.
  5. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2000. "Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2290, The World Bank.
  6. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  7. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  8. Oates, Wallace E., 1993. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 46(2), pages 237-43, June.
  9. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
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