IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oec/ecoaaa/724-en.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Role of Transparency in the Conduct of Monetary Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Makoto Minegishi

    (OECD)

  • Boris Cournède

    (OECD)

Abstract

In contrast to the once prevailing norm of secrecy and opaqueness, transparency has now become one of the main features characterising the conduct of monetary policy. Detailed analysis of eleven OECD central banks shows that communication practices have converged markedly in the direction of ever greater transparency. Empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that transparency contributes to the successful conduct of monetary policy: higher transparency is a typical element of monetary frameworks that are associated with better anchored inflation expectations and more stable inflation outcomes. Despite this general trend toward increased transparency, however, central banks differ in actual communication practices. There is a particular divergence with respect to transparency in the decision-making process and communication regarding future policy inclination. Although the appropriate degree of transparency in these areas is an unsettled issue, the fact that financial dislocation is impairing conventional monetary transmission makes these two areas critical for policy implementation. Le rôle de la transparence dans la conduite de la politique monétaire À rebours des habitudes de secrets et d’opacité qui ont pu prévaloir par le passé, la transparence constitue désormais un moyen essentiel de mise en œuvre de la politique monétaire. Une étude approfondie des pratiques de onze banques centrales de la zone OCDE confirme la convergence vers toujours plus de transparence. Les résultats empiriques sont cohérents avec l’hypothèse selon laquelle la transparence contribue à l’efficacité de la politique monétaire : en moyenne, les cadres de politique monétaire qui fournissent un meilleur ancrage des anticipations d’inflation et une inflation plus stable s’appuient sur un niveau plus élevé de transparence. Malgré une tendance générale vers davantage de transparence, les pratiques de communication diffèrent encore sensiblement d’une banque centrale à l’autre. Les divergences sont particulièrement marquées s’agissant de la transparence à propos des procédures de décision et de l’orientation future de la politique monétaire. Bien que le degré optimal de transparence sur ces deux sujets demeure un objet de débat, le fait que les troubles financiers actuels obèrent les canaux traditionnels de transmission de la politique monétaire donne à ces deux questions une importance toute particulière.

Suggested Citation

  • Makoto Minegishi & Boris Cournède, 2009. "The Role of Transparency in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 724, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:724-en
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/221128317344
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph S. Weber, 2016. "Central Bank Transparency and Inflation (Volatility) – New Evidence," Working Papers 163, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    2. Man-Keung Tang & Xiangrong Yu, 2011. "Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics," IMF Working Papers 11/209, International Monetary Fund.
    3. repec:kap:iecepo:v:15:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10368-016-0365-z is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Iulian Vasile Popescu, 2013. "Analysis of Central Banks Transparency in Countries on the Road to the European Single Currency," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 9(5), pages 74-85, October.
    5. Diego Moccero & Shingo Watanabe & Boris Cournède, 2011. "What Drives Inflation in the Major OECD Economies?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 854, OECD Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    anticipation d'inflation; communication; communication; inflation expectation; monetary policy; politique monétaire; transparence; transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:724-en. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/edoecfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.