Games in Coalitional Form
How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoffs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of social justice when the context is how people behave in society. Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory offers a uni ed framework and solutions for addressing such questions. This brief survey presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
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