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Employment protection and unemployment benefits: On technology adoption and job creation in a matching model

We analyse the effects of different labour market policies - employment protection, unemployment benefits and payroll taxes - on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are randomly matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex-post bargaining. In this setting, unemployment benefits are unambiguously detrimental both to job creation and technology adoption while the effects of employment protection are mixed, as higher firing costs stifle job creation but stimulate technology investments. This suggests that a 'flexicurity' policy, with low employment protection and high unemployment benefits, might have the adverse effect of slowing down technological progress and job growth. Indeed, our analysis of the optimal policy solution suggests that flexicurity is often not optimal, and may be optimal only in conjunction with payroll subsidies.

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Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 3/2012.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:03/2012
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  22. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2009. "A Positive Theory of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 7333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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