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Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Outside Options

Author

Listed:
  • Takako Fujiwara-Greve

    (Department of Economics, Keio University)

  • Yosuke Yasuda

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Abstract

In many repeated interactions, repetition is not guaranteed but instead must be agreed upon. We formulate a model of voluntary repetition by introducing outside options to a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and investigate how the structure of outside options affects the sustainability of mutual cooperation. When the outside option is deterministic and greater than the value of mutual defection, the lower bound of the discount factors that sustain repeated cooperation is greater than the one for ordinary repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, making cooperation more difficult. However, stochastic outside options with the same mean may reduce the lower bound of discount factors as compared to the deterministic case. This is possible when the stochasticity of the options increases the value of the cooperation phase more than the value of the punishment phase. Necessary ansufficient conditions for this positive effect are given under various option structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Yosuke Yasuda, 2009. "Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Outside Options," GRIPS Discussion Papers 09-10, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ngi:dpaper:09-10
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    File URL: https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=1010&item_no=1&attribute_id=20&file_no=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    outside option; repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma; cooperation; perturbation;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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