Network Neutrality and Congestion Sensitive Content Providers: Implications for Service Innovation, Broadband Investment and Regulation
We consider a two-sided market model with a monopolistic Internet Service Provider (ISP), network congestion sensitive content providers (CPs), and Internet customers in order to study the impact of Quality-of-Service (QoS) tiering on service innovation, broadband investments, and welfare in comparison to network neutrality. We find that QoS tiering is the more efficient regime in the short-run. However it does not promote entry by new, congestion sensitive CPs, because the ISP can expropriate much of the CPs' surplus. In the long-run, QoS tiering may lead to more or less broadband capacity and welfare, depending on the competition-elasticity of CPs' revenues.
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