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Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Kaplow
  • Steven Shavell

Abstract

The public at large, many policymakers, and some economists hold views of social welfare that attach some importance to factors other than individuals' utilities. This note shows that any such non-individualistic notion of social welfare conflicts with the Pareto principle.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle," NBER Working Papers 7051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7051
    Note: LE PE
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7051.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    3. Musgrave, Richard A., 1990. "Horizontal Equity, Once More," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(2), pages 113-22, June.
    4. Musgrave, Richard A., 1990. "Horizontal Equity, Once More," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 43(2), pages 113-122, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis Kaplow, 2000. "Horizontal Equity: New Measures, Unclear Principles," NBER Working Papers 7649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate

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