IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/34468.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Peyman Shahidi
  • Gili Rusak
  • Benjamin S. Manning
  • Andrey Fradkin
  • John J. Horton

Abstract

AI agents—autonomous systems that perceive, reason, and act on behalf of human principals—are poised to transform digital markets by dramatically reducing transaction costs. This chapter evaluates the economic implications of this transition, adopting a consumer-oriented view of agents as market participants that can search, negotiate, and transact directly. From the demand side, agent adoption reflects derived demand: users trade off decision quality against effort reduction, with outcomes mediated by agent capability and task context. On the supply side, firms will design, integrate, and monetize agents, with outcomes hinging on whether agents operate within or across platforms. At the market level, agents create efficiency gains from lower search, communication, and contracting costs, but also introduce frictions such as congestion and price obfuscation. By lowering the costs of preference elicitation, contract enforcement, and identity verification, agents expand the feasible set of market designs but also raise novel regulatory challenges. While the net welfare effects remain an empirical question, the rapid onset of AI-mediated transactions presents a unique opportunity for economic research to inform real-world policy and market design.

Suggested Citation

  • Peyman Shahidi & Gili Rusak & Benjamin S. Manning & Andrey Fradkin & John J. Horton, 2025. "The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents," NBER Working Papers 34468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34468
    Note: PR
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w34468.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amine Allouah & Omar Besbes & Josu'e D Figueroa & Yash Kanoria & Akshit Kumar, 2025. "What Is Your AI Agent Buying? Evaluation, Biases, Model Dependence, & Emerging Implications for Agentic E-Commerce," Papers 2508.02630, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    2. Michael D. Grubb, 2009. "Selling to Overconfident Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1770-1807, December.
    3. Andrey Fradkin, 2025. "Demand for LLMs: Descriptive Evidence on Substitution, Market Expansion, and Multihoming," Papers 2504.15440, arXiv.org.
    4. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2018. "Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books," NBER Working Papers 24197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023. "Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2015. "Procrastination, academic success and the effectiveness of a remedial program," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 217-236.
    3. Kopalle, Praveen K. & Pauwels, Koen & Akella, Laxminarayana Yashaswy & Gangwar, Manish, 2023. "Dynamic pricing: Definition, implications for managers, and future research directions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 99(4), pages 580-593.
    4. Chen, Fenglan & Chen, Xing, 2025. "Mitigating pollution emissions of manufacturing firms: Does input servitization matter? Empirical evidence from China," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 320(C).
    5. Griffin, Míde & Lyons, Sean & Mohan, Gretta & Joseph, Merin & Domhnaill, Ciarán Mac & Evans, John, 2022. "Intra-operator mobile plan switching: Evidence from linked survey and billing microdata," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(7).
    6. Sule, Alan & Cemalcilar, Mehmet & Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2015. "Unshrouding Effects on Demand for a Costly Add-on: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey," Center Discussion Papers 198558, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    7. Oren Bar‐Gill & Rebecca Stone, 2012. "Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(3), pages 430-456, September.
    8. Krämer, Jan & Wiewiorra, Lukas, 2012. "Beyond the flat rate bias: The flexibility effect in tariff choice," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 29-39.
    9. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
    10. Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018. "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 681-728, May.
    11. Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, 2019. "Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(1), pages 155-171, August.
    12. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    13. James Wang, 2020. "Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1287-1322, December.
    14. Weihua Liu & Xinran Shen & Di Wang, 2020. "The impacts of dual overconfidence behavior and demand updating on the decisions of port service supply chain: a real case study from China," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 291(1), pages 565-604, August.
    15. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
    16. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012. "Informing consumers about their own preferences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
    17. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo.
    18. Friesen, Lana & Earl, Peter E., 2015. "Multipart tariffs and bounded rationality: An experimental analysis of mobile phone plan choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 239-253.
    19. Grubb, Michael D., 2012. "Dynamic nonlinear pricing: Biased expectations, inattention, and bill shock," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 287-290.
    20. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Behavioral Consumers in Industrial Organization: An Overview," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 247-258, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34468. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.