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Report NEP-DES-2025-11-17
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Samuel Hafner & Marek Pycia & Haoyuan Zeng, 2025, "Mechanism Design with Information Leakage," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2511.00715, Nov.
- Haoyuan Zeng, 2025, "Identity-Compatible Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2511.00723, Nov.
- Sai Praneeth Donthu & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Gogulapati Sreedurga, 2025, "A characterization of strategy-proof probabilistic assignment rules," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2511.04142, Nov.
- Carmelo RodrÃguez à lvarez, 2025, "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single-Peaked Preferences," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, number 2025-06.
- Peyman Shahidi & Gili Rusak & Benjamin S. Manning & Andrey Fradkin & John J. Horton, 2025, "The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34468, Nov.
- Tatyana Deryugina & Alminas Zaldokas & Anastassia Fedyk & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & James Hodson & Ilona Sologoub, 2025, "Rating Government Procurement Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12250.
- Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2025, "Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2511.02675, Nov.
- Arrora. Falak, 2025, "Screening Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1586.