Report NEP-DES-2025-11-17

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Samuel Hafner & Marek Pycia & Haoyuan Zeng, 2025. "Mechanism Design with Information Leakage," Papers 2511.00715, arXiv.org.
• Haoyuan Zeng, 2025. "Identity-Compatible Auctions," Papers 2511.00723, arXiv.org.
• Sai Praneeth Donthu & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Gogulapati Sreedurga, 2025. "A characterization of strategy-proof probabilistic assignment rules," Papers 2511.04142, arXiv.org.
• Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez, 2025. "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single-Peaked Preferences," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2025-06, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
• Peyman Shahidi & Gili Rusak & Benjamin S. Manning & Andrey Fradkin & John J. Horton, 2025. "The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents," NBER Working Papers 34468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Tatyana Deryugina & Alminas Zaldokas & Anastassia Fedyk & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & James Hodson & Ilona Sologoub, 2025. "Rating Government Procurement Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 12250, CESifo.
• Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2025. "Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 2511.02675, arXiv.org.
• Arrora. Falak, 2025. "Screening Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1586, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.