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Sovereign Default and Tax-smoothing in the Shadow of Corruption and Institutional Weakness

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Listed:
  • Marina Azzimonti
  • Nirvana Mitra

Abstract

Emerging countries exhibit volatile fiscal policies and frequent sovereign debt crises, that significantly diminish the well-being of their citizens. International advisors typically suggest developed-world solutions as a remedy. We argue that the root of the problem lies in the institutional environment, which does not incentivize responsible policymaking, particularly tax-smoothing practices. Focusing on democratic representation and control of corruption, our dynamic political-economy bargaining model shows that nations with weaker institutions experience frequent default episodes and greater economic volatility. Our results are in line with stylized facts from a panel of 58 countries between 1990 and 2022. Through counterfactual experiments, we find that while emerging economy policymakers might favor moderate reforms to improve democratic representation, achieving the institutional depth seen in developed countries is politically unfeasible, despite its clear advantages for citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Azzimonti & Nirvana Mitra, 2023. "Sovereign Default and Tax-smoothing in the Shadow of Corruption and Institutional Weakness," NBER Working Papers 31943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31943
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • P33 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Relations, and Aid

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