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Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions: Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance Take Up

Author

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  • Alan C. Monheit
  • Jessica Primoff Vistnes

Abstract

The weak response by the uninsured to policy initiatives encouraging voluntary enrollment in health insurance has raised concerns regarding the extent to which the uninsured value health insurance. To address this issue, we use data from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to examine the association between health insurance preferences and coverage status. We also consider the role of such preferences in decisions to seek out and enroll in employment-based coverage. We find that adults with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are more likely than persons with strong preferences to be uninsured and less likely to acquire coverage. Our econometric work indicates that workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to obtain job offers with insurance, reinforcing prior evidence that workers sort among jobs according to preferences for coverage. We also find that workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to enroll in offered coverage and we estimate the subsidy necessary to compensate such workers for the utility loss were they to enroll. Our results suggest a dual approach to expanding coverage that includes both subsidies and educational efforts to inform targeted groups among the uninsured about the value of health insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan C. Monheit & Jessica Primoff Vistnes, 2006. "Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions: Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance Take Up," NBER Working Papers 12429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Gruber, Jonathan & Lettau, Michael, 2004. "How elastic is the firm's demand for health insurance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1273-1293, July.
    8. Chernew, Michael & Frick, Kevin & McLaughlin, Catherine G., 1997. "Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market: A note on the calculation of welfare loss," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 375-380, June.
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    11. Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd & Scott Leitz & Lynn A. Blewett, 1997. "The Effect of Premiums on the Small Firm's Decision to Offer Health Insurance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(4), pages 635-658.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kanika Kapur & José J. Escarce & M. Susan Marquis & Kosali I. Simon, 2005. "Where do the sick go? Health insurance and employment in small and large firms," Open Access publications 10197/259, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    2. Mohamed, Issam A.W., 2011. "Challenges of formal social security systems in Sudan," MPRA Paper 31611, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Pierre, Aurélie & Jusot, Florence, 2017. "The likely effects of employer-mandated complementary health insurance on health coverage in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 321-328.
    4. Jean Marie Abraham & Thomas DeLeire & Annne Beeson Royalty, 2007. "Health Insurance, Pensions, and Paid Leave: Access to Health Insurance at Small Firms in a Broader Benefit Context: Working Paper 2007-08," Working Papers 18725, Congressional Budget Office.
    5. Kanika Kapur & José J. Escarce & M. Susan Marquis & Kosali I. Simon, 2008. "Where Do the Sick Go? Health Insurance and Employment in Small and Large Firms," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 644-664, January.
    6. Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2009. "Income and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France," Working Papers DT24, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Apr 2009.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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