IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/may/mayecw/n1770807.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A market microstructure explanation of IPOs underpricing

Author

Listed:
  • Patarick Leoni

    () (Economics Department, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

Abstract

In a typical IPO game with first-price auctions, we argue that risk-averse investors always underbid in equilibrium because of subjective interpretations of the firm' communication about its actual value and resulting risk aversion about the likelihood of facing investors with higher valuations. We show that the noisier the investors' inferences of the firm' value (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) the higher the underbidding level. Our finding is independent of winner's curse effects and possible irrationality, and allows for a testable theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Patarick Leoni, 2007. "A market microstructure explanation of IPOs underpricing," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1770807, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  • Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1770807
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N1770807.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leite, Tore, 2005. "Returns to sentiment investors in IPOs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 222-226, November.
    2. Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guillermo Yañez & Carlos Maquieira, 2009. "Rendimiento de Ofertas Públicas Iniciales de Acciones en Chile: Evidencia Empírica entre 1994 y 2007," Serie de Documentos de Trabajo 02, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    IPO underpricing; first-price auction; risk aversion; firm' communication;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1770807. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/demayie.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.