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Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values

Author

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  • Sascha Füllbrunn

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

The Hard Close auction has become a familiar auction format in online markets and in a private value framework this dynamic second-price auction format has experimentally been tested in recent studies. Considering a common value framework, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) demonstrate that in the Hard Close auction format bidders, using a sniping strategy, do not provide information during the auction. We provide contrary results from a laboratory experiment. Bidders provide information during the bidding process, resulting in different bid functions that depend on the bidders private information rank.

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Füllbrunn, 2008. "Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values," FEMM Working Papers 08010, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08010
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    File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2008_Dateien/2008_10.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2008
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; electronic markets; experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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