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Uncovering the Heterogeneity behind Cross-Cultural Variation in Antisocial Punishment

Author

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  • Adrian Bruhin
  • Kelly Janizzi
  • Christian Thöni

Abstract

Antisocial punishment in public good games, i.e., punishment of individuals who contributed the same or more than their punisher, varies substantially across cultures. We exploit the data of Herrmann et al. (2008) and estimate a finite mixture model to uncover the heterogeneity behind this variation in a parsimonious way. The finite mixture model reveals that, overall, the population consists of two cleanly segregated punisher types: 35.3% Type AF subjects who engage in antisocial punishment as wellas free rider punishment and 64.7% Type F subjects who engage exclusively in free rider punishment. Moreover, we find that in cultures with high levels of antisocial punishment, Type AF subjects are more frequent. Despite its parsimony, this classification of subjects into types predicts mean earnings per group and enhances our understanding of the large variation in the effectiveness of peer punishment across cultures.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Bruhin & Kelly Janizzi & Christian Thöni, 2019. "Uncovering the Heterogeneity behind Cross-Cultural Variation in Antisocial Punishment," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.08
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    2. Légeret, Matthieu & Zehnder, Christian, 2022. "Self-regulation after temptation?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    3. Angelsen, Arild & Naime, Julia, 2024. "The mixed impacts of peer punishments on common-pool resources: Multi-country experimental evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    4. Zhang, Yongqiang & Zheng, Zehao & Zhang, Xiaoming & Ma, Jinlong, 2025. "Dynamic punishment-reputation synergy drives cooperation in spatial public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 506(C).
    5. Weber, Till O. & Schulz, Jonathan F. & Beranek, Benjamin & Lambarraa-Lehnhardt, Fatima & Gächter, Simon, 2023. "The behavioral mechanisms of voluntary cooperation across culturally diverse societies: Evidence from the US, the UK, Morocco, and Turkey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 134-152.
    6. Lange, Andreas & Miniesy, Rania & Nicklisch, Andreas & Rabie, Dina & Bock, Olaf & Ross, Johannes, 2023. "Sharing norms and negotiations across cultures: Experimental interactions within and between Egypt and Germany," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 412-440.
    7. Qian, Jun & Zhang, Tongda & Zhang, Yingfeng & Chai, Yueting & Sun, Xiao & Wang, Zhen, 2023. "The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 442(C).
    8. Jun Qian & Tongda Zhang & Xiao Sun & Yueting Chai, 2023. "The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 96(2), pages 1-15, February.
    9. Jana Freundt & Holger Herz, 2025. "A Cross-Country Study of Preferences for Choice Autonomy," CESifo Working Paper Series 12238, CESifo.

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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