Welfarism, Libertarian Paternalism and Political Economy: Three Perspectives on Economic Expertise
This paper proposes and compares different characterization of what an economic expert is — his/her role, functions and legitimacy — according to different conceptions of economics: welfarism, libertarian paternalism and positive political economy. We show that both welfarism and libertarian paternalism allows expert to impose their views, their preferences to the individuals. This is not the case with political economy.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mongin, P., 1999.
"The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics,"
99-33, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Peter Boettke & Steven Horwitz, 2005. "The Limits of Economic Expertise: Prophets, Engineers, and the State in the History of Development Economics," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 37(5), pages 10-39, Supplemen.
- David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, 2008. "Analytical Egalitarianism," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 473-479, 07.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.