Debt, Managerial Incentives and Learning
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References listed on IDEAS
- Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M., 1988.
"Managerial Compensation And The Agency Costs Of Debt Finance,"
Cahiers de recherche
8827, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M., 1988. "Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of Debt Finance," Cahiers de recherche 8827, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
More about this item
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-24 (All new papers)
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