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Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact



We show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification. Moreover, by making sanctions contingent upon the economic situation of countries, the stability pact provides for risk sharing. Differences in initial debt levels, however, reduce the scope for unanimous support for a pact. We introduce also endogenous „fiscal discipline“ whose unobservability leads to moral hazard in its provision. If countries are ex ante identical, it is nevertheless optimal to make sanctions at least to some extent contingent on countries’ economic situation. However, with cross-country differences in the costs of providing discipline, some countries may oppose such contingency.

Suggested Citation

  • Roel Beetsma & Henrik Jensen, "undated". "Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:99-11

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    1. Humpage, Owen F, 1999. "U.S. Intervention: Assessing the Probability of Success," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(4), pages 731-747, November.
    2. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Lewis, Karen K., 1996. "Does foreign exchange intervention signal future monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 285-312, April.
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    4. Fatum, Rasmus, 2000. "On the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange intervention," Working Paper Series 0010, European Central Bank.
    5. Edison, H.J., 1993. "The Effectiveness of Central-Bank Intervention: A Survey of the Litterature after 1982," Princeton Studies in International Economics 18, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    6. Bonser-Neal, Catherine & Tanner, Glenn, 1996. "Central bank intervention and the volatility of foreign exchange rates: evidence from the options market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 853-878, December.
    7. Dominguez, Kathryn M & Frankel, Jeffrey A, 1993. "Does Foreign-Exchange Intervention Matter? The Portfolio Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1356-1369, December.
    8. Campbell, Cynthia J. & Wesley, Charles E., 1993. "Measuring security price performance using daily NASDAQ returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 73-92, February.
    9. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
    10. Lewis, Karen K, 1995. "Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related, and Does It Really Matter?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 185-214, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dury, Karen & Pina, Alvaro M., 2003. "Fiscal policy in EMU: simulating the operation of the Stability Pact," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 179-206, February.
    2. Alho, Kari, 2002. "The Stability Pack and Inefficiencies in Fiscal Policy Making in EMU," Discussion Papers 715, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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