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Other-regarding behaviour: Testing guilt- and reciprocity-based models

Author

Listed:
  • Tobias Regner

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

  • Nicole S. Harth

    (International Graduate College, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena)

Abstract

We analyse two types of belief-dependant models of social preferences: guilt aversion and reciprocity. In particular, we test the relevance of their input variables (second-order beliefs and general dispositions for guilt/reciprocity). The data confirm the predictions of belief-dependant models. Both second-order beliefs and a participant's sensitivity to guilt/reciprocity are relevant for the decisions taken. Second-order beliefs appear to have an inverse U-shaped effect on the extent of kind behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Tobias Regner & Nicole S. Harth, 2010. "Other-regarding behaviour: Testing guilt- and reciprocity-based models," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-072, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-072
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    Cited by:

    1. Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander & Suetens, Sigrid, 2017. "A note on testing guilt aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 233-239.
    2. Alexander Morell, 2014. "The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Dec 2016.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social preferences; other-regarding behaviour; belief-dependent models; experiments; trust game; guilt aversion; beliefs; psychological game theory; emotions; reciprocity;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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