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Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian Goerg

    (BonnEconLab, University of Bonn)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

  • Gari Walkowitz
  • Torsten Weiland

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

Abstract

Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects signi?cantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and other-regarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers signi?cantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players' provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Goerg & Werner Güth & Gari Walkowitz & Torsten Weiland, 2008. "Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-028, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-028
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    File URL: http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00098805
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    Cited by:

    1. David Hugh-Jones & Alexia Katsanidou & Gerhard Riener, 2009. "Political Discrimination in the Aftermath of Violence: the case of the Greek riots," GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 30, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equity; fairness; social preferences; ultimatum bargaining; redistribution; cross-national experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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