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The Management of Projects and Product Experimentation: Lessons from the Entertainment Industries

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  • Mark Lorenzen
  • Lars Frederiksen

Abstract

The paper analyses management of product innovation in project-based industries, offering a view on management not only of firms, but also of markets. It first argues that projects are prominent in industries where the nature of consumer demand means that product innovation takes place as experimentation. Then, the paper argues that if skills needed for projects are very diverse and projects are complex, there are few internal managerial economies of projects, and the scope for management then transcends the boundaries of firms. In these cases, markets become organized in combinations of people, contracts, and other institutions, in order to facilitate the coordination of market-based projects. While contracts play a role, a continuous, active role of knowledgeable managers (leaders and boundary spanners) is also often necessary. Such managers ? and thus (core parts of) whole industries ? are embedded in project ecologies at particular places, which is why we see geographical clusters in many project-based industries. The paper is mainly conceptual, but develops its argument by drawing examples from the Entertainment industries throughout.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Lorenzen & Lars Frederiksen, "undated". "The Management of Projects and Product Experimentation: Lessons from the Entertainment Industries," IVS/CBS Working Papers 2005-01, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ivs:iivswp:05-01
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Project organization; product innovation; portfolio management of projects; entertainment;

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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