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Property Rights, Productivity, and the Nature of Noncontractible Actions in a Franchise System

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  • Hennessy, David A.

Abstract

Viewing ownership as bargaining power when some actions cannot be contracted upon, we explore the role of property rights in franchising, paying particular attention to complementary franchisor and franchisee noncontractibles, and cases of franchisor scale economies. Then, and regardless of ownership, franchise system performance increases with the number of franchises and with productivity innovations. Performance also increases if the franchisor can visibly commit to actions. Limits on scale economies suggest that the franchise system may perform better when assets are franchisee-owned. The strategic environment is more complex when noncontractibles substitute. Then all parties may be immiserized by a productivity innovation.DESCRIPTORS: Transactional-Relationships; Contracts-and-Reputation; Networks (L140); Firm-Organization-and-Market-Structure-Markets-vs-Hierarchies; Vertical-Integration (L220); Business-Economics (M210); Franchise-; Franchising-; Property-Rights; Property-; Organizational-Behavior; Transaction-Costs; Property-Rights (D230)AVAILABILITY: http://www.elsevier.com/homepage/sae/econbase/jeboDIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER: doi:10.1016/S0921-8009(03)00256-8

Suggested Citation

  • Hennessy, David A., 2003. "Property Rights, Productivity, and the Nature of Noncontractible Actions in a Franchise System," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11750, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:11750
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    Cited by:

    1. Chia Sun, 2014. "A conceptual framework for R&D strategic alliance assessment for Taiwan’s biotechnology industry," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 259-279, January.
    2. Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, 2008. "Are Franchises Bad Employers?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(2), pages 147-162, January.
    3. Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, 2007. "Are Franchises Bad Employers?," NBER Working Papers 13327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Wang, Vey & Lai, Chung-Hui, 2011. "Franchise fee, competition and economic growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 2090-2099, September.
    5. Emmanuel Raynaud, 2010. "The Structure of Franchise Contracts," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 20, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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