The Optimal Prudential Deterrence of Price Fixing Agreements
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, January.
- Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-425, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2004.
"Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 651-673, Winter.
- Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 487, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2003. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 26, Society for Computational Economics.
- Flavia Roldán, 2012.
"Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 965-987, December.
- Roldán, Flavia, 2008. "Collusive networks in market sharing agreements in the presence of an antitrust authority," UC3M Working papers. Economics we085024, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Joseph E. Harrington, 2005.
"Optimal Cartel Pricing In The Presence Of An Antitrust Authority,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 145-169, February.
- Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002.
- Roldan, Flavia, 2011. "Covert networks and antitrust policy," IESE Research Papers D/932, IESE Business School.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-1998-11-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-11-20 (Public Finance)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/ .