Semiproportional Values for TU Games
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two- person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure com- posed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
|Date of creation:||May 2001|
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- repec:spr:compst:v:53:y:2001:i:1:p:35-49 is not listed on IDEAS
- T. S. H. Driessen & D. Paulusma, 2001. "Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 53(1), pages 35-49, April.
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