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Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools

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  • Schiff, Aaron
  • Aoki, Reiko

Abstract

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.

Suggested Citation

  • Schiff, Aaron & Aoki, Reiko, 2008. "Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 360, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:360 Note: "14 September 2007" -- p. 1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nancy Gallini, 2011. "Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2011(3), pages 5-30.
    2. Gallini, Nancy, 2014. "Cooperating with competitors: Patent pooling and choice of a new standard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 4-21.
    3. Akifumi Ishihara & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2013. "Dark Sides of Patent Pools with Compulsory Independent Licensing," CARF F-Series CARF-F-318, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent pools; competing standards; consortium standards;

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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