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The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK: Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination Hypothesis?

  • Kubo, Katsuyuki

Although there are many studies on executive compensation, many of these studies often take for granted the 'Anglo-American style of corporate governance'. This paper seeks to contrast the effect of corporate governance on the directors' incentive, by comparing the UK and Japan. There is a positive and significant relationship between directors' pay and employees' average wage in Japan, suggesting that both directors and employees have a similar incentive system while no such relationship is observed in the UK. These results suggest that the difference in corporate governance affects the director's salary and their incentives.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/13959/1/wp2001-2a.pdf
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Paper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number 2001-2.

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Length: 35 p.
Date of creation: Feb 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2001-2
Note: February 2001
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