Regulation and Unintended Consequences
Production of desirable outputs such as Kwh of electricity are often accompanied by the production of undesirable or ‘bad’ outputs such as SO2. These undesirable outputs are frequently regulated in the sense that their production is not allowed to exceed certain amounts. In this paper we analyze what we call the unintended consequences of regulation of bads where that regulation limits the quantity of bads produced. We consider the simple case in which there is one good and one bad output. Under constant returns to scale we provide a theorem that characterizes the situation in which quantity regulation of the bad output restricts the production of the intended good output. Our theorem is in the spirit of Shephard’s proof of the Law of Diminishing Returns.
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- Baumgartner, Stefan & Dyckhoff, Harald & Faber, Malte & Proops, John & Schiller, Johannes, 2001. "The concept of joint production and ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 365-372, March.
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