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Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Télécom's Experience

Author

Listed:
  • François Degeorge

    (Swiss Finance Institute [Geneva] - Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Dirk Jenter

    (MIT Sloan - Sloan School of Management - MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

  • Alberto Moel
  • Peter Tufano

    (Harvard Business School - Harvard University)

Abstract

In 1997, France Télécom, the state-owned French telephone company, went through a partial privatization. The government offered current and prior France Télécom employees the opportunity to buy portfolios of shares with various combinations of discounts, required holding periods, leverage, tax treatment, and levels of downside protection. We adapt a neoclassical model of investment decisionmaking that takes into account firm-specific human capital and holding period restrictions to predict how employees might respond to the share offers. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze the employees' characteristics and their decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what form of stock alternatives they selected. The results are broadly consistent with the neoclassical model. However, we report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees' investment decisions; (2) the amount of funds invested in the stock plans seems driven by a different set of forces than the decision to participate, which we suspect reflects a "threshold effect" that we attempt to measure; (3) employees "left on the table" benefits equal to one to two month's salary by failing to participate; and (4) most potential participants underweighted the most valuable asset, a decision hard to reconcile with rational portfolio choice.

Suggested Citation

  • François Degeorge & Dirk Jenter & Alberto Moel & Peter Tufano, 2000. "Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Télécom's Experience," Working Papers hal-00598172, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00598172
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Aubert, 2006. "Understanding Employer's Stock Holdings in the French Company Savings Plans Using the Literature on the American 401(k) plans," Post-Print halshs-00188518, HAL.
    2. Francisco Gomes & Alexander Michaelides, 2005. "Optimal Life‐Cycle Asset Allocation: Understanding the Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 869-904, April.
    3. Aubert, Nicolas & Garnotel, Guillaume & Lapied, André & Rousseau, Patrick, 2014. "Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 423-434.
    4. Boyle, Glenn & Guthrie, Graeme, 2005. "Human Capital and Popular Investment Advice," Working Paper Series 18962, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    5. Thomas Rapp & Nicolas Aubert, 2011. "Bank Employee Incentives and Stock Purchase Plans Participation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 185-203, December.
    6. Nicolas Aubert & Niaz Kammoun & Yacine Bekrar, 2018. "Financial decisions of the financially literate," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 39(2), pages 43-91.
    7. Klos Alexander & Weber Martin, 2006. "Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Non-Tradable Income: An Experimental Analysis," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 427-448, December.
    8. Alex Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, 2019. "The Role of Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Gift and Incentive? Evidence from a Multinational Corporation," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(1), pages 86-106, March.
    9. Nicolas Aubert, 2008. "Developing an Ownership Culture with Employee Share Purchase Plans: Evidence from France," Zeitschrift fuer Personalforschung. German Journal of Research in Human Resource Management, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 22(2), pages 130-151.
    10. Nicolas Aubert & Thomas Rapp, 2010. "Employee's investment behaviors in a company based savings plan," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 31(1), pages 5-32.
    11. Bergman, Nittai K. & Jenter, Dirk, 2007. "Employee sentiment and stock option compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 667-712, June.
    12. Hibbert, Ann Marie & Lawrence, Edward R. & Prakash, Arun J., 2013. "Does knowledge of finance mitigate the gender difference in financial risk-aversion?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 140-152.
    13. Nicolas Aubert & Hachmi Ben Ameur & Guillaume Garnotel & Jean‐Luc Prigent, 2018. "Optimal Employee Ownership Contracts Under Ambiguity Aversion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 238-251, January.
    14. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18962 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Meulbroek, Lisa, 2005. "Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 443-474, October.
    16. Philippe Desbrières, 2002. "Les actionnaires salariés," Revue française de gestion, Lavoisier, vol. 141(5), pages 255-281.
    17. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Stock options and employee behavior," Papers 05-26, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    18. repec:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:427-448 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Subjective Stock Option Values and Exercise Decisions: Determinants and Consistency," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-31, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    20. Nicolas Aubert & Bernard Grand & André Lapied & Patrick Rousseau, 2009. "Is employee ownership so senseless," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 30(2), pages 5-29.
    21. Agarwal,Sumit & Morais,Bernardo & Ruiz Ortega,Claudia & Zhang,Jian, 2016. "The political economy of bank lending : evidence from an emerging market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7577, The World Bank.
    22. Eric C.A. Kaarsemaker, 2008. "Employee Share Ownership as Moderator of the Relationship between Firm-Specific Human Capital Investments and Organizational Commitment," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 19(4), pages 324-339.
    23. Zacharias Sautner & Martin Weber, 2009. "How Do Managers Behave In Stock Option Plans? Clinical Evidence From Exercise And Survey Data," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 123-155, June.
    24. Glenn W. Boyle & Graeme A. Guthrie, 2005. "Human Capital and Popular Investment Advice," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 139-164.
    25. Dong Lee, 2009. "How Do Employees View Their Underwater Stock Options?: Evidence from the Stock Option Exchange Program," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 35(3), pages 273-296, June.

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    JEL classification:

    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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