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Preparing Negotiations in Services: EC Audiovisuals in the Millenium Round. The World Services Congress on “Services: Generating Global Growth and Opportunity'

Author

Listed:
  • Emmanuel Cocq

    (GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Patrick Messerlin

    (GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Under the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement, only 19 WTO Members have made commitments in audiovisual services in their GATS schedule. As illustrated by Table 1, these commitments are generally of limited scope and magnitude [WTO, 1998]. Among the large audiovisual producers, only the United States have taken substantial commitments at the various stages of audiovisual production, distribution, and transmission.2/ Though much more limited, the commitments by Hong Kong, Japan and India (the world largest film producer) have shown the acceptance by large producers with very influential cultures to consider theissue of liberalization in audiovisual services with an open mind (...).

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Cocq & Patrick Messerlin, 1999. "Preparing Negotiations in Services: EC Audiovisuals in the Millenium Round. The World Services Congress on “Services: Generating Global Growth and Opportunity'," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01093510, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01093510
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01093510v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Winston, Clifford, 1993. "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1263-1289, September.
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