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Commodity taxes and taste heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Gauthier

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Fanny Henriet

    (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We study optimal linear commodity taxes in the presence of non-linear income taxes when agents differ in skills and tastes for consumption. We show that optimal commodity taxes are partly determined by a many-person Ramsey rule when there is taste heterogeneity within income classes. The usual role of commodity taxes in relaxing incentive constraints explains the remaining part of these taxes when there is taste heterogeneity between income classes. We quantify these two parts using French consumption microdata and find that commodities taxes are only shaped by many-person Ramsey considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Gauthier & Fanny Henriet, 2018. "Commodity taxes and taste heterogeneity," Post-Print halshs-01626787, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01626787
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.017
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01626787v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Hellwig, Christian & Werquin, Nicolas, 2022. "A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work: Optimal Tax Design as Redistributional Arbitrage," CEPR Discussion Papers 16863, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Paweł Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Joanna Krysta & Filip Tokarski, 2025. "Incentive Separability," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 539-567.
    3. Hellwig, Christian & Werquin, Nicolas, 2022. "Using Consumption Data to Derive Optimal Income and Capital Tax Rates," TSE Working Papers 22-1284, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2026.
    4. Stéphane Gauthier & Fanny Henriet, 2023. "Targeting Taxes on Local Externalities," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 151, pages 1-36.
    5. Paweł Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Mohammad Akbarpour & Scott Duke Kominers*, 2025. "Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 25/787, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Spencer Bastani & Sebastian Koehne, 2024. "How Should Consumption Be Taxed?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 80(3), pages 259-302.
    7. Thomas,Alastair Geoffrey Arthur, 2024. "VAT Rate Structures in Theory and Practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10677, The World Bank.
    8. Hunt Allcott & Benjamin B Lockwood & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2019. "Regressive Sin Taxes, with an Application to the Optimal Soda Tax," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1557-1626.
    9. Alain Babatoundé & Bart Capéau & Romain Houssa, 2023. "Welfare effects of indirect tax policies in West Africa," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 746845, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    10. Antoine Ferey & Benjamin B. Lockwood & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2024. "Sufficient Statistics for Nonlinear Tax Systems with General Across-Income Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(10), pages 3206-3249, October.
    11. Feger, Fabian & Radulescu, Doina, 2020. "When environmental and redistribution concerns collide: The case of electricity pricing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    12. Ashley C. Craig & Thomas Lloyd & Dylan T. Moore, 2025. "Do Distributional Concerns Justify Lower Environmental Taxes?," Papers 2512.05602, arXiv.org.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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