Competition policy as a lever for industrial policy: Some reflections on horizontal cartels prosecution in the post-war France
[La politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle dans la France de l’après-guerre]
The Establishment of the cartels technical committee in 1953, which prefigured the contemporary French competition authority, seems to participate in the same movement than the German competition law and the Treaty of Rome four years later. However some differences have to be put into relief. First, it didn’t deal with individual abuses of dominance. Second, the collusive practices targeted mainly concerned bid-rigging in public procurement in the reconstruction and modernisation plan. Thus, if this competition policy experience contrasts with war experiences and the interwar period arguments for a regulated competition, it cannot be assimilated with West German one, inspired by the Ordoliberal School. Sanctioning horizontal collusion makes sense within an industrial policy model based on a close co-operation between Government and some national champions. In that sense, the French competition law beginnings may be analysed as a tool for ensuring the implementation of a vertically conceived industrial policy.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2015|
|Publication status:||Published in Document de travail OFCE, n° 2015-23, septembre 2015, 26p. 2015|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01208103|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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