IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competition policy as a lever for industrial policy: Some reflections on horizontal cartels prosecution in the post-war France
[La politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle dans la France de l’après-guerre]


  • Claude Didry

    () (IDHE - Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Economie - ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8, Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Marty

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


The Establishment of the cartels technical committee in 1953, which prefigured the contemporary French competition authority, seems to participate in the same movement than the German competition law and the Treaty of Rome four years later. However some differences have to be put into relief. First, it didn’t deal with individual abuses of dominance. Second, the collusive practices targeted mainly concerned bid-rigging in public procurement in the reconstruction and modernisation plan. Thus, if this competition policy experience contrasts with war experiences and the interwar period arguments for a regulated competition, it cannot be assimilated with West German one, inspired by the Ordoliberal School. Sanctioning horizontal collusion makes sense within an industrial policy model based on a close co-operation between Government and some national champions. In that sense, the French competition law beginnings may be analysed as a tool for ensuring the implementation of a vertically conceived industrial policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Didry & Frédéric Marty, 2015. "Competition policy as a lever for industrial policy: Some reflections on horizontal cartels prosecution in the post-war France
    [La politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle
    ," Post-Print halshs-01208103, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01208103
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item


    competition policy; cartel agreements; neoliberalism; utilities.; politiques de concurrence; cartels; néo-libéralisme; services publics;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01208103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.