Competition Policy As A Lever For Industrial Policy: Some Reflections On Horizontal Cartels Prosecution In The Post-War France
[La politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle dans la France de l’après-guerre]
The establishment of the cartels technical commission in 1953, seems to prefigure the German competition law and the Treaty of Rome four years later. However some differences have to be put into relief. First, it does not participate to a defence of competition law based order as the German ordo-liberals promoted at that time. Second, the collusive practices targeted mainly concerned bid-rigging practices in public procurement in the reconstruction and modernisation plans. If this competition policy contrasts with war experiences and the interwar period arguments for a regulated competition, sanctioning horizontal collusion makes sense within an industrial policy model based on a close co-operation between Government and some national champions
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||19 Jan 2017|
|Publication status:|| Published in Gouvernement & action publique, Presses de sciences po, 2017, 5 (4), pp.23-45. |
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01442775|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01442775. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.