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Education, redistributive taxation and confidence

Author

Listed:
  • Kai A. Konrad

    (WZB - Social Science Research Center Berlin - Social Science Research Center Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin = Free University of Berlin)

  • Amadéo Spadaro

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UIB - Universitat de les Illes Balears = Universidad de las Islas Baleares = University of the Balearic Islands)

Abstract

We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the highly confident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai A. Konrad & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Education, redistributive taxation and confidence," Post-Print halshs-00754180, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754180
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.03.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Ball & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in dynamic economies," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590555, HAL.
    2. Falch, Torberg & Justina, Fischer, 2016. "Welfare state generosity and student performance: Evidence from international student tests 1980-2003," MPRA Paper 74553, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Bernasconi, Michele & Profeta, Paola, 2012. "Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96.
    4. Schneider, Andrea, 2010. "Redistributive taxation vs. education subsidies: Fostering equality and social mobility in an intergenerational model," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 597-605, August.
    5. Salvador Ball & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in dynamic economies," Working Papers halshs-00590555, HAL.
    6. Falch, Torberg & Fischer, Justina AV, 2011. "Welfare state generosity and student performance: Evidence from international student tests," MPRA Paper 35269, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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