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Coordination and information sharing about pest resistance

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Lemarié

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

  • Philippe Marcoul

    (Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology - University of Alberta)

Abstract

We develop a dynamic oligopolistic Cournot model of a pesticide market where resistance to pesticides can develop. We first study firms' incentives for resistance management through pricing and we distinguish two cases of demand for pesticides; one where users are able to coordinate their pesticide use and one where they are not. We show that users benefit from coordination, but that this gain is at the expense of firms facing a lower demand. When firms are allowed to obtain scientific information on the likelihood of pest resistance and, possibly, to share this information among themselves, we find that they have an incentive to acquire information and to share it with competitors. They also benefit from transmitting this information to users if the latter are coordinated. In the case of uncoordinated users, transmission of information to users is not necessarily profitable for firms if it favors their coordination. Finally, we discuss the policy implications for existing information sharing committees in the pesticide industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Lemarié & Philippe Marcoul, 2018. "Coordination and information sharing about pest resistance," Post-Print hal-01667500, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01667500
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Chelsea Chelsea & Ana Espinola-Arredondo, 2022. "Fungicide Resistance and Misinformation: A Game Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2020-4, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    2. Chelsea A. Pardini & Ana Espínola‐Arredondo, 2023. "Fungicide resistance and misinformation: A game theoretic approach," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 71(2), pages 171-201, June.
    3. Zheng, Yanan & Goodhue, Rachael E., 2021. "Cross-crop Spatial Externalities of Pesticide Use: Management of Lygus Bugs in the San Joaquin Valley of California," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 313888, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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