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En toutes franchises : de la capacité d'obéissance à la capacité d'initiative


  • Délila Allam

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


Coordination and franchise: from an obedience to an capacity of initiative Summary Franchise networks are a form of collective entrepreneurship that bring together entrepreneurs spread over an economic territory who choose to act in a concerted and consistent manner with regard to the expectations of consumers. This hybrid form of coordination is different from both the market and the firm and responds to a new economic environment. In this paper, I seek to analyze this phenomenon byexamining the recruitment criteria for prospective franchisees and their managerial consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Délila Allam, 2011. "En toutes franchises : de la capacité d'obéissance à la capacité d'initiative," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00643792, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00643792
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Claude Ménard, 2004. "The Economics of Hybrid Organizations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 345-345, September.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    3. Philippe Askenazy & Katia Weidenfeld, 2007. "Les soldes de la loi Raffarin," Post-Print halshs-00754858, HAL.
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    incertainty and franchising relationship; Coordination; incertitude et relation de franchise;

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