Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities
Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding.
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