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Import of Institutions: the Regional Level

Author

Listed:
  • Konstantin Yanovsky

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Sergey Zhavoronkov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Yulia Malysheva

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

Abstract

In the frame of the present research we considered a hypothesis on the existence of a trend to a widespreading of standards and practices which expand the horizon of the regional authorities' discretion and possibilities for their discretionary regulation, due to the federal authorities' failures to maintain the fundamentals of the Rule of Law. The collected data testify in favor of the hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Konstantin Yanovsky & Sergey Zhavoronkov & Yulia Malysheva, 2006. "Import of Institutions: the Regional Level," Published Papers 4, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:4
    as

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    File URL: https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/ppaper/4Yanovsky.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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