Expected Utility and Cognitive Consistency
One may reason before making a decision on perceiving potential objections to expected utility-preference. Cognitive consistency is attained by making full use of available information, i.e. consistent preference and reasons. I show that coincidence between the rational choice and the normative preference requires perfect consciousness, and I provide maximizing rules of decision conditional on preference which are valid with imperfect consciousness. A necessary and sufficient condition for expected utility to be descriptively valid is given. Under risk, the rational choice converges towards expected utility through unconscious learning. Many well-known paradoxes and anomalies of choice, evaluation and information are solved for well-behaved preferences.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
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