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The Microsoft Antitrust Case

Author

Listed:
  • Economides, N.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the law and economics of United States v. Macrosoft, a landmark case of multitrust intervention in network industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Economides, N., 2001. "The Microsoft Antitrust Case," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 01-00, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:01-00
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Peneder & Martin Woerter, 2014. "Competition, R&D and innovation: testing the inverted-U in a simultaneous system," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 653-687, July.
    2. O. Tejada & M. Álvarez-Mozos, 2016. "Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 289-327, December.
    3. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Why do oil prices jump (or fall)?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 1029-1043, March.
    4. Mouré, Christopher, 2021. "Soft-wars: A Capital-as-Power Analysis of Google's Power Trajectory," Review of Capital as Power, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism, vol. 2(1), pages 71-90.
    5. Nicholas Economides & Brian Viard, 2012. "Pricing of Complements and Network Effects," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Nicholas Economides & Brian Viard, 2003. "Pricing of Complementary Goods and Network Effects," Working Papers 03-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    7. Günter Knieps, 2006. "Competition in the Post-Trade Markets: A Network Economic Analysis of the Securities Business," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 45-60, March.
    8. Nicholas Economides, 2007. "Nonbanks in the payments system: vertical integration issues," Proceedings – Payments System Research Conferences, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    9. Edmond Baranes, 2006. "Bundling and Collusion on Communications Markets," Working Papers 06-17, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006.
    10. Javier Campos Méndez & Juan Luis Jiménez González, 2003. "Old and new ideas in Competition Policy," Documentos de trabajo conjunto ULL-ULPGC 2003-06, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la ULPGC.
    11. Marcel Canoy & Patrick Rey & Eric van Damme, 2004. "Dominance and Monopolization," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Robert Innes & Stephen F. Hamilton, 2009. "Vertical restraints and horizontal control," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 120-143, March.
    13. Syngjoo Choi & Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2017. "Trading in Networks: Theory and Experiments," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 784-817.
    14. Nicholas Economides, 2006. "Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction," Chapters, in: Dennis W. Jansen (ed.), The New Economy and Beyond, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Konrad Degen & Alexander Gleiss, 2025. "Time to break up? The case for tailor-made digital platform regulation based on platform-governance standard types," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 35(1), pages 1-23, December.
    16. Shaviv, Elad & Zemah-Shamir, Shiri & Parag, Yael & Teschner, Naama, 2025. "A delicate dance: Value-added services and electricity security in decentralized systems," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    17. Leonhard Dobusch & Elke Schüßler, 2013. "Theorizing path dependence: a review of positive feedback mechanisms in technology markets, regional clusters, and organizations," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 22(3), pages 617-647, June.
    18. Reeti Agarwal, 2018. "Indian Customers’ Attitude Towards Bundling: A Basis for Classification and Targeting," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 19(2), pages 510-531, April.
    19. Jenkins, Mark & Liu, Paul & Matzkin, Rosa L. & McFadden, Daniel L., 2021. "The browser war — Analysis of Markov Perfect Equilibrium in markets with dynamic demand effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 244-260.
    20. Steven J. Davis & Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, 2001. "Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms," NBER Working Papers 8411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Nicholas Economides, 2001. "The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 71-79, March.
    22. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Resource extraction by cartels facing constraints on cooperation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 409-427, August.
    23. Stephen Jarman & Deniz D. Karaman Örsal, 2020. "The regulation of zero-price markets by the competition authorities in the USA and the EU," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 21(4), pages 315-343, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment

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