Learning Dynamics: Complete and Incomplete Learning
Models of expextations formation via learning by economic agents have recently been developed in the literature. Currently, the most common approach leads to complete learning in which asymptotically agents have rational expectations (though cases of instability also exist). Dynamics with learning can differ radically rational expectations (RE) dynamics. The paper illustrates the possibilities of an equilibrium dynamics using a simple model of coordination failures.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
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